本公司 营业时间调整为 周一至周六,上午9点30到下午6点。周日休息。
笔记本行情交流,最新更新
ThinKPad T410,X201 港行
2010年学生机已到货
国内行货 X100E,SL410,SL510
Edge E30,E40,E50 报价
购机,即赠送十全大补丸礼包
T系列共10样赠品,样样实用
X系列更特别加送4G系统恢复U盘
[关于我们]兼购机向导流程
外地客户购机运输指南
发贴积分,抵用现金,优惠多多
iPad iPhone4 行情交流
港行 iPad iPhone 4 现货销售
NB式快修服务:5-7天返港保修
退换货、运输理赔条例

NBUSER推出3年全免快修升级服务
8年感恩,真情免费赠送活动。
专业,为您倾情奉献!
免费清理风扇服务
售前使用问题集锦
售后使用问题集锦
各种周边配件报价(支持淘宝交易)
新到iPhone4/iPad版
来自韩国的仿真皮纹外壳贴膜
新版笔记本背包报价
近200种精选笔记本包供您选择。
X系列赠送4G恢复U盘
Win7开始提供
恢复超快,使用方便。
赠品ThinkPad鼠标08年9月份涉假
召回更换原装行货鼠标活动

Federal Reserve Branch of San Francisco Economic Letter

[ 615 查看 / 2 回复 ]

May 15, 2009

Bart Hobijn, Research Advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, states his views on the current economy and the outlook:


  • The economy shows many signs of continued weakness. That said, several indicators suggest that the pace of contraction is slowing. This does not mean that economic activity is increasing, but that it might bottom out in coming months. Historically, such indicators have signaled a turning point in the business cycle and the onset of a recovery. Given current circumstances though, we expect the subsequent recovery to be very slow compared to previous ones.
  • Continued weakness is particularly evident in the recent labor market data. Nonfarm payroll employment declined by a substantial 539,000 jobs in April, as firms, operating in a weak and uncertain sales environment, continued to cut costs. The very thin silver lining is that the April job decline was significantly smaller than those in the previous three months. However, the unemployment rate has increased to 8.9 percent.
  • The main drag on economic activity has been investment. This consists of four main components: housing construction; commercial construction (offices, industrial buildings, retail space, and other commercial real estate); purchases of equipment and software; and changes in inventories.
  • The commercial real estate market is going through a correction very similar to that of the housing market. Prices of commercial real estate almost doubled between 2000 and 2007 and have since declined by more than 20 percent. Vacancy rates have increased, the delinquency rate on commercial mortgages has risen, and the pace of construction has slowed to a crawl. Starting in June, commercial-mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), which are an important source of financing in the commercial real estate market, will be eligible collateral under the Federal Reserve's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). Almost no CMBS have been issued in the U.S. since the summer of 2008.
  • The current technology-sector slowdown is of the same order of magnitude as the tech bust of 2001. However, in this downturn, the inventory levels in the tech sector are much lower than in 2001. This suggests that production might pick up relatively quickly when demand strengthens and inventories are replenished. We expect such inventory replenishments to extend well beyond the tech sector and emerge as one of the sources of GDP growth in the second half of the year.
  • Not all economic news has been dire over the last couple of months, supporting the view that the economy might be close to its trough. The financial sector is showing signs of stabilization and earnings reports of many Standard & Poor's 500 companies have exceeded—admittedly low—market expectations. As a result, stock market valuations have had a large rebound.
  • Most importantly, we have seen the resumption of securities issuances in several financial markets that had come to a virtual standstill after September 2008. For example, substantial amounts of consumer asset-backed securities (ABS) were issued in March and April. Such issuances were almost nonexistent from October 2008 through January 2009. These issuances have coincided with a continued narrowing of credit spreads across a wide range of markets.
  • In addition, the Federal Reserve Board's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey indicates that substantially fewer banks are tightening lending standards now than at the end of 2008. This will presumably lead to easier access to credit for creditworthy consumers and businesses going forward.
  • These developments suggest a deceleration of the adverse feedback loop that is at the heart of the current economic downturn. This loop is a cycle in which losses by banks and other lenders lead to a tightening of credit, which in turn reduces spending by households and businesses. The resulting drop in demand drags down the housing sector and the broader economy, contributing to greater loan losses and tighter credit. This slowdown of the adverse feedback loop, as well as the easing of the pace of job losses, have contributed to a jump in consumer confidence.
  • Going forward, stabilization of financial markets and institutions as well as fiscal and monetary stimulus will provide momentum for positive economic growth by the end of this year. We do not expect policy measures to be the only source of such momentum. Currently, some types of economic activity are so unsustainably below trend, that we expect substantial corrections over the next year.
  • One example is consumer purchases of durable goods. Auto sales are currently about 3 million units a year below the estimated number of cars scrapped annually. If this level of sales persisted, then the number of registered light vehicles in the U.S. would decline by more than 1 percent in 2009 alone, a historically unprecedented decline in the stock of cars. Instead, it is more likely that households and businesses will end up making at least a fraction of those postponed replacement purchases in the coming months.
  • Residential investment is also far below trend. A conservative estimate of the trend level of housing starts is about 1.55 million a year. Between the beginning of 2001 and end of 2006 about 1.7 million excess housing units (above trend) were started. In other words, in those six years, the U.S. housing boom generated an overhang equivalent to more than a year of housing starts. A correction of 1.1 million units of this overhang has occurred since the start of 2007 because of the reduction in residential investment. If activity returns to trend in 12 months, then the rest of this overhang would be worked off. This is a very optimistic scenario, positing a high growth rate of residential investment. If the return to trend is slower, an “underhang” in residential investment would most likely occur. Either way, it is unlikely that residential investment will remain at its current depressed levels for a long time.
  • In sum, we expect GDP growth to turn positive by the fourth quarter of this year. However, we envision a much slower recovery than those of the past four recessions. In fact, we only expect GDP growth to return to its trend level by the end of 2010. The result is a gap between GDP and potential GDP in excess of 6 percent.
  • We expect this persistent slack in the economy will result in a peak unemployment rate of around 9.5 percent and a very slow decline in the rate during 2010 and 2011.
  • Finally, in light of the large degree of economic slack we are forecasting over the next two years, we expect inflation to remain relatively low.


http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/fedviews/graphs.pdf
TOP

Boy, were people happy two weeks ago, when a 30%+ stock rocket ride from the bottom convinced everyone that we were headed for a spectacular economic recovery.

Spirits have dampened somewhat since, with the market going limp day after day.  But stocks are still hanging around fair value, and a sense of optimism remains.

Well, regardless of what the market does over the coming weeks, don't embrace the happy talk that we're going to suddenly go right back to life as it was in 2007.

The key problem in the economy, remember, is debt--specifically, way too much of it.  See the chart from the SF Fed above, which compares debt, wealth, and income. The good news is that consumers have finally started deleveraging.  But their wealth has plummeted a lot faster than their debt. And if history is any guide, the deleveraging process is going to take decades, not years.

Take a look at that chart of Japan's experience to the right, from the San Fran Fed.  Look at where they are now compared to where we are now (the series aren't apples to apples, but the deleveraging process is similar).  Note that Japan's economy is in the middle of its second decade of stagnation.  And its stock market is trading at one-fifth of its pre-deleveraging peak.  (The analogous performance for us would be DOW 3500 in 2026).

In future years, US consumers will have to save money to pay down all that debt.  The savings rate will likely go back to its level in the good old days--8%-10% of GDP (see chart below).

All the money consumers devote to debt reduction, meanwhile, will be money that they aren't spending.  If our situation is similar to Japan's, the SF Fed estimates--if we go back to our pre-binge leverage ratios--this consumer deleveraging will shave 3/4 of a percentage point per year in consumption growth. (About half a point of GDP growth).

That doesn't sound like much?  Many future economic forecasts, and many stock-market forecasts, are based on long-term growth of 3%+ per year.  (The forecasts underlying Social Security and Medicare, for example.)  Cut the growth of consumption by 75%, and you're also going to have businesses investing less.  Add it all together, and you're probably shaving a point off GDP growth, so that the long-term growth rate might be 2%, not 3%.  That makes a big difference for tax revenue (not to mention Social Security contributions).
TOP

One of the core macroeconomic themes that Zero Hedge has been expounding on since inception, which mirrors some of the major concerns of David Rosenberg, has been the evaporation of consumer wealth, income and equity as a function of both declining stock and real asset values and persistently high consumer debt. In an economic paper, the San Francisco Federal Reserve confirms that these concerns are not unfounded, and could be the very core of the processes that undermine the administration's attempts to restore economic growth.

While the administration is doing all it can through various media conduits to imprint the idea that inflation is all but a guaranteed reality at this point, so that consumers begin borrowing at an expansive pace yet again, consumer leveraging is exactly the process that has commenced unwinding, and the obvious impact on the personal saving rate which has been growing at a dramatic pace, has been visible throughout the economy. And as the consumer deleverages additionally, deflation is a certainty, as the combined impact of asset value decline and associated leverage flow through the economy, further depressed prices of goods and services. The four charts below from the Fed's release strike at the heart of the administration's faulty attempt to relever the US consumer.



Unfortunately for Bernanke and Geithner, the deleveraging process has commenced, and regardless of how many treasuries are issued, and how much additional debt the U.S. incurs, the demand side for credit is just not there, sticking banks with basements full of shrinkwrapped packages of hundred dollar bills, that will sit dusty and unused for years. The only immediate impact is that at some point in the not too distant future, the U.S. will need to print bonds to satisfy just the interest payments on these very bonds, which is an unsustainable state and only has one outcome.

In a very amusing section from the release, the San Fran Fed is discussing the financial behaviour of the consumer, when in fact the very same words are 100% applicable to the U.S. Treasury itself:

    More than 20 years ago, economist Hyman Minsky (1986) proposed a “financial instability hypothesis.” He argued that prosperous times can often induce borrowers to accumulate debt beyond their ability to repay out of current income, thus leading to financial crises and severe economic contractions.

    Until recently, U.S. households were accumulating debt at a rapid pace, allowing consumption to grow faster than income. An environment of easy credit facilitated this process, fueled further by rising prices of stocks and housing, which provided collateral for even more borrowing.The value of that collateral has since dropped dramatically, leaving many households in a precarious financial position, particularly in light of economic uncertainty that threatens their jobs.

    Going forward, it seems probable that many U.S. households will reduce their debt. If accomplished through increased saving, the deleveraging process could result in a substantial and prolonged slowdown in consumer spending relative to pre-recession growth rates. Alternatively, if accomplished through some form of default on existing debt, such as real estate short sales, foreclosures, or bankruptcy, deleveraging could involve significant costs for consumers, including tax liabilities on forgiven debt, legal fees, and lower credit scores. Moreover, this form of deleveraging would simply shift the problem onto banks that hold these loans as assets on their balance sheets. Either way, the process of household deleveraging will not be painless.

The last paragraph is probably the most lucid explanation of the conundrum the Federal Reserve and the Treasury are in currently. And all that Bernanke and Geithner are attempting to do is not just make sure these very banks can survive another day with trillions of worthless loans on their books, but do all they can to relend them once again into private (consumer and hedge fund) hands.

This approach is flawed and as time passes and the consumer savings rate increases, the bifurcation between the Fed's plans and reality will only become more evident, with the cost being increasing deflation, while the U.S. accumulates higher and higher sovereign debt. The combined impact of both processes could end up having a devastating geopolitical impact on the United States.
TOP
采用Intel 最新酷睿 i5 i7 的新款ThinkPad T410 X201 火爆上市